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Abstract. The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that inte-
grates communication technologies with the physical layer operation of
the energy systems. Security and resilience mechanisms by design are
important to provide guarantee operations for the system. This chapter
provides a layered perspective of the smart grid security and discusses
game and decision theory as a tool to model the interactions among sys-
tem components and the interaction between attackers and the system.
We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the design of
cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing proto-
col at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges
of the information security at the management layer of the grid. The
chapter will discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in
addressing multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.
1 Introduction
The smart grid aims to provide reliable, efficient, secure, and quality energy gen-
eration/distribution/consumption using modern information, communications,
and electronics technologies. The integration with modern IT technology moves
the power grid from an outdated proprietary technology to more common ones
such as personal computers, Microsoft Windows, TCP/IP/Ethernet, etc. It can
provide the power grid with the capability of supporting two-way energy and
information flow, isolate and restore power outages more quickly, facilitate the
integration of renewable energy resources into the grid and empower the con-
sumer with tools for optimizing energy consumption. However, in the meantime,
it poses security challenges on power systems as the integration exposes the
system to public networks.
Many power grid incidents in the past have been related to software vulner-
abilities. In [1], it is reported that hackers have inserted software into the USA
power grid, potentially allowing the grid to be disrupted at a later date from
a remote location. As reported in [2], it is believed that an inappropriate soft-
ware update has led to a recent emergency shutdown of a nuclear power plant
in Georgia, which lasted for 48 hours. In [3], it has been reported that a com-
puter worm, Stuxnet has been spread to target Siemens SCADA systems that
are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes. On November
29, 2010, Iran confirmed that its nuclear program had indeed been damaged by
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Stuxnet [4, 5]. The infestation by this worm may have damaged Iran’s nuclear
facilities in Natanz and eventually delayed the start-up of Iran’s nuclear power
plant.
Modern power systems do not have built-in security functionalities, and the
security solutions in regular IT systems may not always apply to systems in crit-
ical infrastructures. This is because critical infrastructures have different goals
and assumptions concerning what needs to be protected, and have specific appli-
cations that are not originally designed for a general IT environment. Hence, it is
necessary to develop unique security solutions to fill the gap where IT solutions
do not apply.
In this chapter, we describe a layered architecture to address the security
issues in power grids, which facilitates identifying research problems and chal-
lenges at each layer and building models for designing security measures for
control systems in critical infrastructures. We also emphasize a cross-layer view-
point toward security issues in power grids in that each layer can have security
dependence on the other layers. We need to understand the tradeoff between the
information assurance and the physical layer system performance before design-
ing defense strategies against potential cyber threats and attacks. As examples,
we address three security issues of smart grid at different layers, namely, the
resilient control design problem at the physical power plant, the data-routing
problem at the network and communication layer, and the information security
management at the application layers.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first describe
the general multi-layer architecture of cyber-physical systems and the related
security issues associated with each layer. In Section 3, we focus on the cyber
and physical layers of the smart grid and propose a general cross-layer framework
for robust and resilient controller design. In Section 4, we discuss secure network
routing problem at the data communication and networking layers of the smart
grid. In addition, we discuss the centralized vs. decentralized routing protocols
and propose a hybrid architecture as a result of the tradeoff between robustness
and resilience in the smart grid. In Section 5, we present the challenges of the
information security at the management layer of the grid. We conclude finally in
Section 6 and discuss future research directions that can follow from the multi-
layer model using game-theoretic tools.
2 Multi-layer architecture
Smart grid comprises of physical power systems and cyber information systems.
The integration of the physical systems with the cyberspace allows new degrees
of automation and human-machine interactions. The uncertainties and hostilities
existing in the cyber environment have brought emerging concerns for modern
power systems. It is of supreme importance to have a system that maintains
state awareness and an acceptable level of operational normalcy in response to
disturbances, including threats of an unexpected and malicious nature [7].
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The physical systems of the power grid can be made to be resilient by incorpo-
rating features such as robustness and reliability [8], while the cyber components
can be enhanced by many cyber-security measures to ensure dependability, se-
curity, and privacy. However, the integration of cyber and physical components
does not necessarily ensure overall reliability, robustness, security, and resilience
of the power system. The interaction between the two environments can create
new challenges in addition to the existing ones. To address these challenges, we
first need to understand the architecture of smart grids. The smart grid can
be hierarchically organized into six layers, namely, physical layer, control layer,
data communication layer, network layer, supervisory layer and management
layer. The first two layers, physical layer and control layer, can be jointly seen as
physical environment of the system. The data communication layer and network
layer comprise the cyber environment of the power grid. The supervisory layer
together with the management layer constitute the higher-level application layer
where services and human-machine interactions take place.
The power plant is at the physical layer, and the communication network
and security devices are at the network and communication layers. The controller
interacts with the communication layer and the physical layer. An administrator
is at the supervisory layer to monitor and control the network and the system.
Security management is at the highest layer where security policies are made
against potential threats from attackers. SCADA is the fundamental monitoring
and control architecture at the control area level. The control center of all major
U.S. utilities have implemented a supporting SCADA for processing data and
coordinating commands to manage power generation and delivery within the
EHV and HV (bulk) portion of their own electric power system [9].
To further describe the functions at each layer, we resort to Figure 1, which
conceptually describes a smart grid system with a layering architecture. The
lowest level is the physical layer where the physical/chemical processes we need
to control or monitor reside. The control layer includes control devices that are
encoded with control algorithms that have robust, reliable, secure, and fault-
tolerant features. The communication layer passes data between devices and dif-
ferent layers. The network layer includes the data packet routing and topological
features of control systems. The supervisory layer offers human-machine inter-
actions and capability of centralized decision-making. The management layer
makes economic and high-level operational decisions.
In the following, we identify problems and challenges at each layer and pro-
pose problems whose resolution requires a cross-layer viewpoint.
Physical layer: The physical layer comprises the physical plant to be con-
trolled. It is often described by an ordinary differential equation (ODE) model
from physical or chemical laws. It can also be described by difference equations,
Markov models, or model-free statistics. We have the following challenges that
pertain to the security and reliability of the physical infrastructure. First, it
is important to find appropriate measures to protect the physical infrastructure
against vandalism, environmental change, unexpected events, etc. Such measures
often need a cost-and-benefit analysis involving the value assessment of a partic-
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Fig. 1. A conceptual control system with layering.
ular infrastructure. Second, it is also essential for engineers to build the physical
systems with more dependable components and more reliable architecture. It
brings the concern on the physical maintenance of the control system infrastruc-
tures that demands cross-layer decision-making between the management and
physical layers [11].
Control layer: The control layer consists of multiple control components, in-
cluding observers/sensors, intrusion-detection systems (IDSs), actuators and other
intelligent control components. An observer has the sensing capability that col-
lects data from the physical layer and may estimate the physical state of the
current system. Sensors may need to have redundancies to ensure correct read-
ing of the states. The sensor data can be fused locally or sent to the supervisor
level for global fusion. A reliable architecture of sensor data fusion will be a crit-
ical concern. An IDS protects the physical layer as well as the communication
layer by performing anomaly-based or signature-based intrusion detection. An
anomaly-based ID is more common for physical layer whereas a signature-based
ID is more common for the packets or traffic at the communication layer. If
an intrusion or an anomaly occurs, an IDS raises an alert to the supervisor or
work hand-in-hand with built-in intrusion prevention systems (related to emer-
gency responses, e.g., control reconfiguration) to take immediate action. There
lies a fundamental a trade-off between local decisions versus a centralized de-
cision when intrusions are detected. A local decision, for example, made by a
prevention system, can react in time to unanticipated events; however, it may
incur a high packet drop rate if the local decision suffers high false negative rates
due to incomplete information. Hence, it is an important architectural concern
on whether the diagnosis and control modules need to operate locally with IDS
or globally with a supervisor.
Communication layer: Communication layer is where we have a communi-
cation channel between control layer components or network-layer routers. The
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communication channel can take multiple forms: wireless, physical cable, blue-
tooth, etc. The communication layer handles the data communication between
devices or layers. It is an important vehicle that runs between different layers and
devices. It can often be vulnerable to attacks such as jamming and eavesdrop-
ping. There are also privacy concerns of the data at this layer. Such problems
have been studied within the context of wireless communication networks [12].
However, the goal of critical infrastructure may distinguish themselves from the
conventional studies of these issues.
Network layer: The network layer concerns the topology of the architecture.
It comprises of two major components: one is network formation, and the other
one is routing. We can randomize the routes to disguise or confuse the attackers
to achieve certain security or secrecy or minimum delay. Moreover, once a route
is chosen, how much data should be sent on that route has long been a concern
for researchers in communications [13–15]. In control systems, many specifics of
the data form and rates may allow us to reconsider this problem in a control
domain.
Supervisory layer: The supervisory layer coordinates all layers by designing
and sending appropriate commands. It can be viewed as the brain of the system.
Its main function is to perform critical data analysis or fusion to provide an im-
mediate and precise assessment of the situation. It is also a holistic policy maker
that distributes resources in an efficient way. The resources include communi-
cation resources, maintenance budget as well as control efforts. In centralized
control, we have one supervisory module that collects and stores all historical
data and serves as a powerful data-fusion and signal-processing center [21, 22].
One key challenge at this layer is to defend against advanced persistent threats
which behave stealthily, leverage social engineering, and exploit the vulnera-
bilities of the computer networks to obtain unauthorized credentials to access
the control system networks [58, 59]. Hence it is critical to implement security
mechanism at this layer to detect intrusive, stealthy and deceptive behaviors,
and ensure the integrity of information processing and the availability of critical
services.
Management layer The management layer is a higher-level decision-making
engine, where the decision-makers take an economic perspective toward the re-
source allocation problems in control systems. At this layer, we deal with prob-
lems such as: (i) how to budget resources to different systems to accomplish
a goal [16]; (ii) how to develop policies to maintain data security and pri-
vacy [19, 20]; (iii) how to manage patches for control systems, e.g., disclosure
of vulnerabilities to vendors, development and release of patches [23]; and (iv)
how to invest in cyber insurance to mitigate the losses incurred by the cyberat-
tacks [17,18].
Addressing the security challenges at the multiple layers of the smart grid
requires a holistic and integrable framework that can capture different system
features of the multi-layer cyber-physical security problems. Game theory is a
versatile quantitative tool which can be used to model different types of adversar-
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ial interactions between a defender and an attacker. For example, at the physical
and the control layers, game-theoretic methods can be used to used to design ro-
bust and resilient controllers for dynamical systems in an uncertain or adversar-
ial environment [53,55,57,62]. At the supervisory layer, game-theoretic methods
can be used to understand spear-phishing attacks [54], insider threats [61], and
the advanced persistent threats [56, 59, 60, 65]. At the management layer, game
theory serves a primary tool to design strategies for security investment and in-
formation disclosure policies. At the network layer, game theory has been used as
a quantitative method for analyzing network security policies and designing de-
fense mechanisms [12,44,46,53]. The wide range of application domains of game
theory has made it an ideal tool for developing a unifying framework for a holistic
and fundamental understanding of cyber-physical security across different layers
of functionalities. In the following section, we will discuss the applications of
game-theoretic methods for addressing control, network and management layer
problems.
3 Robust and Resilient Control
The layered architecture in Figure 1 can facilitate the understanding of the
cross-layer interactions between the physical world and the cyber world. In this
section, we aim to establish a framework for designing a resilient controller for
the physical power systems. In Figure 2, we describe a hybrid system model
that interconnects the cyber and physical environments. We use x(t) and θ(t) to
denote the continuous physical state and the discrete cyber state of the system,
which are governed by the laws f and Λ, respectively. The physical state x(t)
is subject to disturbances w and can be controlled by u. The cyber state θ(t)
is controlled by the defense mechanism l used by the network administrator as
well as the attacker’s action a.
We view resilient control as a cross-layer control design, which takes into
account the known range of unknown deterministic uncertainties at each state
as well as the random unanticipated events that trigger the transition from one
system state to another. Hence, it has the property of disturbance attenuation
or rejection to physical uncertainties as well as damage mitigation or resilience
to sudden cyber attacks. It would be possible to derive resilient control for the
closed-loop perfect-state measurement information structure in a general setting
with the transition law depending on the control action, which can further be
simplified to the special case of the linear quadratic problem.
The framework depicted in Figure 2 can be used to describe the voltage
regulation problem of a power generator subject to sudden faults or attacks. A
power system has multiple generators interconnected through a large dynamic
network. There are three types of attacks that can be considered:
– Sensor Attacks: Attackers can launch a man-in-the-middle attack to intro-
duce a bias to the measured parameters or multiply the sensed value by a
constant.
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Fig. 2. The interactions between the cyber and physical systems are captured by their
dynamics governed by the transition law Λ and the dynamical system f . The physical
system state x(t) is controlled by u with the presence of disturbances and noises.
The cyber state θ(t) is controlled by the defense mechanism l used by the network
administrator as well as the attacker’s action a.
– Actuator Attacks: Attackers can intrude the power control system and dis-
rupt the physical control loops. The attack can cause an error on the gener-
ators’ output torque, and consequently system dynamics are modified.
– Controller Attacks: An attacker can change the control signal sent through
the SCADA system to an extent without being noticed by the system ad-
ministrator. Consequently, the output of the controller is modified.
The framework can incorporate networked control system models to capture
different aspects of network effects, for example, sampled-data systems, systems
with delayed measurements, and model predictive control systems. The optimal
design of the cyber and physical system can be made jointly by viewing each
design process as a game-theoretic problem. For example, a zero-sum differen-
tial game problem can be used to design a robust controller while a stochastic
game model can be used to design a defense strategy. With the joint game de-
sign, the framework yields control and defense strategies depend on both cyber
states and physical states, and there is the need for the development of advanced
computational tools to compute such joint control and defense strategies.
4 Secure network routing
One of the challenging issues at the data communication and networking layers
of the smart grid in Figure 1 is the assurance of secure routing of phasor mea-
surement unit (PMU) and smart meter (SM) data in the open network, which
is enabled by the adoption of IP-based network technologies. It is forecasted
that 276 million smart grid communication nodes will be shipped worldwide
during the period from 2010 to 2020, with annual shipments increasing dramat-
ically from 15 million in 2009 to 55 million by 2020 [24]. The current dedicated
network or leased-line communication methods are not cost-effective to connect
large numbers of PMUs and SMs. Thus, it is foreseen that IP-based network
technologies are widely adopted since they enable data to be exchanged in a
routable fashion over an open network, such as the Internet [25–29]. This will
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bring benefits such as efficiency and reliability, and risks of cyber attacks as
well. Without a doubt, smart grid applications based on PMUs and SMs will
change the current fundamental architecture of communication network of the
power grid, and bring new requirements for communication security. Delay, in-
completeness, and loss of PMU and SM data will adversely impact smart grid
operation in terms of efficiency and reliability. Therefore, it is important to
guarantee integrity and availability of those PMUs and SMs data. To meet the
QoS requirements in terms of delay, bandwidth, and packet loss rate, QoS-based
routing technologies have been studied in both academia and the telecommuni-
cations industry [30–33]. Unlike video and voice, data communications of PMUs
and SMs have different meanings of real-time and security, especially in terms of
timely availability [25, 34–38]. Therefore, QoS-based and security-based routing
schemes for smart grid communications should be studied and developed to meet
smart grid application requirements in terms of delay, bandwidth, packet loss,
and data integrity.
We can leverage the hierarchical structure of power grids and investigate a
routing protocol that maximizes the QoS along the routing path to the control
room. In addition, the data communication rates between the super data con-
centrator can be optimized at the penultimate level with the control center. A
hybrid structure of routing architecture is also highly desirable to enable the
resilience, robustness, and efficiency of the smart grid.
Hierarchical routing: The smart grid has a multi-layer structure that is built
upon the current hierarchical power grid architecture. The end-users, such as
households, communicate their power usage and pricing data with a local area
substation which collects and processes data from SMs and PMUs. In the smart
grid, the path for the measurement data may not be predetermined. The data
can be relayed from smaller scale data concentrators (DCs) to some super data
concentrators (SDCs) and then to the control room. With the widely adopted IP-
based network technologies, the communications between households and DCs
can be in a multi-hop fashion through routers and relay devices. The goal of
each household is to find a path with minimum delay and maximum security to
reach DCs and then substations. This optimal decision can be enabled by the
automated energy management systems built in SMs. Figure 3 illustrates the
physical structure of the smart grid communication network. The PMUs and
SMs send data to DCs through a public network. DCs process the collected data
and send the processed data to SDCs through (possibly) another public network.
In the depicted smart grid, the data from a PMU or an SM has to make sev-
eral hops to reach the control room. The decision for a meter to choose a router
depends on the communication delay, security enhancement level, and packet
loss rate. In addition, the decisions for a DC to choose an SDC also depends
on the same criteria. The communication security at a node is measured by the
number of security devices such as firewalls, intrusion-detection systems (IDSs)
and intrusion-prevention systems (IPSs) deployed to reinforce the security level
at that node. We can assign a higher utility to network routers and DCs that
are protected by a larger number of firewalls, IDSs/IPSs and dedicated private
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Fig. 3. An example of the physical structure of the multi-layer smart grid communi-
cation network.
networks in contrast to public networks. This relatively simple metric only con-
siders one aspect of the control system cyber security. It can be further extended
to include more security aspects by considering the authorization mechanisms,
the number of exploitable vulnerabilities, potential damages as well as recov-
ery time after successful attacks. The readers can refer to [7, 40–42] for more
comprehensive metrics.
A trade-off with higher security is the latency and packet loss rate incurred
in data transmission. A secure network inevitably incurs delays in terms of pro-
cessing (encrypting/decrypting) and examining data packets. We can model the
process of security inspection by a tandem queueing network. Since the arriving
packets are inspected by IDS using signature-based or anomaly-based methods
to detect malicious behaviors, each security device can be modeled with a queue-
ing model. One simple example is the M/M/1 queue whose external arrival rate
follows a Poisson process and the service time follows an exponential distribu-
tion. The latency caused by the security devices such as IDSs/IPSs is due to the
number of pre-defined attack signatures and patterns to be examined [11,43,44].
In addition, devices such as IPSs can also lead to high packet loss due to their
false negative rates in the detection.
Furthermore, a node with a higher level of security may be preferred by many
meters or routers, eventually leading to a high volume of received data and hence
higher level of congestion delay. Hence it leads to a distributed decision-making
problem in which each device determines its route by assessing the tradeoffs
between security risks, the congestion delay and the quality of services. This
problem can be analyzed using a game-theoretical approach to yield distributed
routing decisions in the smart grid [14,52]. The solution concept of mixed Nash
equilibrium [39] as a solution outcome is desirable for two reasons. First, in
theory, mixed Nash equilibrium always exists for a finite matrix game [39] and
many learning algorithms such as fictitious play and replicator dynamics can
lead to mixed Nash equilibrium [45–47]. Second, the randomness in the choice of
routes makes it harder for an attacker to map out the routes in the smart grid.
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Centralized vs. decentralized architectures: A centralized routing archi-
tecture ensures the global efficiency, and it is robust to small disturbances from
SMs and individual DCs or SDCs. However, it is costly to implement central-
ized planning on a daily basis for a large-scale smart grid. In addition, global
solutions can be less resilient to unexpected failures and attacks as they are less
nimble for changes in routes and it takes time for the centralized planner to
respond in a timely manner.
On the other hand, decentralized decision-making can be more computa-
tionally friendly based on local information and hence the response time to the
emergency is relatively fast. The entire system becomes more resilient to local
faults and failures, thanks to the independence of the players and the reduced
overhead on the response to unanticipated uncertainties. However, the decentral-
ized solution can suffer from high loss due to inefficiency [21,22]. Hence, we need
to assess the tradeoff between efficiency, reliability, and resilience for designing
the communication protocol between the control stations and the SDCs [63,64].
5 Management of information security
The use of technologies with known vulnerabilities exposes power systems to
potential exploits. In this section, we discuss information security management
which is a crucial issue for power systems at the management layer in Figure 1.
The timing between the discovery of new vulnerabilities and their patch avail-
abilities is crucial for the assessment of the security risk exposure of software
users [48, 50]. The security focus in power systems is different from the one in
computer or communication networks. The application of patches for control sys-
tems needs to take into account the system functionality, avoiding the loss of ser-
vice due to unexpected interruptions. The disclosure of software vulnerabilities
for control systems is also a critical responsibility. Disclosure policy indirectly af-
fects the speed and quality of the patch development. Government agencies such
as CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center) cur-
rently act as a third party in the public interest to set an optimal disclosure policy
to influence the behavior of vendors [51].
The decisions involving vulnerability disclosure, patch development, and patch-
ing are intricately interdependent. In Figure 4, we illustrate the relationship
between these decision processes. A control system vulnerability starts with its
discovery. It can be discovered by multiple parties, for example, individual users,
government agencies, software vendors or attackers and hence can incur different
responses. The discoverer may choose not to disclose it to anyone, may choose to
fully disclose through a forum such as Bugtraq [49], may report to the vendor,
or may provide to an attacker. Vulnerability disclosure is a decision process that
can be initiated by those who have discovered the vulnerability. Patch develop-
ment starts when the disclosure process reaches the vendor and finally a control
system user decides on the application of the patches once they become avail-
able. An attacker can launch a successful attack once it acquires the knowledge
of vulnerability before a control system patches its corresponding vulnerabilities.
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The entire process illustrated in Figure 4 involves many agents or players, for
example, system users, software vendors, government agencies, attackers. Their
state of knowledge has a direct impact on the state of vulnerability management.
Fig. 4. A holistic viewpoint toward vulnerability discovery, disclosure, development,
and patching. An attacker can discover a vulnerability or learn it from a disclosure
process, eventually influencing the speed of patch application. A discoverer can choose
to fully disclose through a forum or report to the vendor or may provide to an attacker.
A vulnerability can be disclosed to a vendor for patch development or leaked to the
attacker.
We can compartmentalize the task of vulnerability management into differ-
ent submodules: discovery, disclosure, development, and patching. The last two
submodules are relatively convenient to deal with since the agents involved in
the decision making are very specific to the process. The models for discovery
and disclosure can be more intricate in that these processes can be performed
by many agents and hence specific models should be used for different agents
to capture their incentives, utility, resources, and budgets. In [23], a dynamic
model for control system patching is established to assist users in making opti-
mal patching decisions. It has been shown that the optimal patching intervals
are much shorter when risks of potential attacks are taken into account in the
system. A dynamic game problem can thus be formulated to study the optimal
frequency of patching to minimize the risk of an unpatched control system while
an attacker aims to determine the time to launch the attack.
6 Discussions and Challenges
Security issues that arise in the smart grid constitute a pivotal concern in modern
power-system infrastructures. In this chapter, we have discussed a six-layer se-
curity architecture for the smart grid, motivated by the OSI for the Internet and
PRM models for enterprise and control systems. We have identified the security
challenges present at each layer and pinpointed a holistic viewpoint for security
solutions in the smart grid. The layered architecture facilitates the understand-
ing of the tradeoff between the information assurance at the cyber-related layers
and the physical layer system performance.
We have presented security issues at three different layers. The resilient con-
trol design at the physical system is pivotal for modern power systems. We need
a hybrid framework in which the occurrence of unanticipated events is modeled
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by a stochastic switching, and deterministic uncertainties are represented by the
known range of disturbances. It is important to develop new methodologies to
take the resilience of physical systems into consideration and enable a cross-layer
control design for modern power grids.
At the data communication and network layers, we need to investigate the
secure routing problem in the smart grid, which arises from the adoption of IP-
based network technologies due to the wide use of PMUs and smart meters. It is
important to leverage the multi-layer structure of power grids and discuss a rout-
ing protocol that is based on distributed optimization of the quality-of-service
along individual routing paths. The hybrid structure of the routing protocol is
desirable to incorporate the desirable features of the centralized and decentral-
ized architectures.
The use of information technologies in power systems poses additional po-
tential threats due to the frequent disclosure of software vulnerabilities. At the
higher level of the information security management layer, we have discussed
a series of policy-making decisions on vulnerability discovery, disclosure, patch
development and patching. We can use a system approach to understand the
interdependencies of these decision processes.
Game-theoretic methods have provided formal approaches to model the ad-
versarial interactions at multiple layers of the cyber-physical energy system. The
game model has taken different forms to design resilient control systems, secure
routing, and patching mechanisms. Understanding the security of multi-layer en-
ergy system requires a holistic model that integrates the game models to provide
an integrated framework for designing cross-layer security strategies. Mitigation
of one security threat at one layer can be sometimes more effective than achiev-
ing it at other layers. In addition, the success of mitigation of certain attacks
can rely on the strategies implemented at other layers. Hence cross-layer game-
theoretic models are essential for developing an effective defense under budget
constraints for the multi-layer system as a whole.
More challenges as a result of the multi-layer architecture of the smart grid
security involve the integration of game theory, machine learning, control theory,
and data-driven approaches for detection, automation, and reconfiguration in
the smart grid. In addition to the security problems illustrated in the chapter,
there are other security and privacy issues existing at each layer, for example,
the jamming and eavesdropping problems at the data communication layer, the
user data privacy problem at the management layer, and the system reliability
problem at the network layer. Furthermore, the multi-layer framework can be
extended to study multi-agent systems. The interactions between sub-systems in
the smart grid can reside at the network, communication, and physical layers. It
will be interesting to investigate the competition and cooperation for resources
at multiple layers.
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